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 The past twenty years has witnessed an enormous resurgence of interest in 
cosmopolitanism among scholars working in a wide variety of academic 
disciplines, including philosophy, political science, sociology, English, history, 
and law. Building on the already-contested tradition of cosmopolitan reflection, 
whose roots can be traced back to the Cynics and Stoics of ancient Greece, and 
which is substantially reconceptualized during the Age of Enlightenment, these 
scholars introduced a dizzying variety of theoretical innovations and novel 
applications. Cosmopolitanism is now characterized by some, for example, as a 
necessarily universalistic theory, while for others it is definitively post-
universalistic. Some celebrate the cosmopolitan condition as a kind of 
rootlessness, while others insist that it is unavoidably rooted. For some, 
cosmopolitanism constitutes a kind of utopian ethical or political ideal, while for 
others it names a banal, everyday reality. And for some, it is a phenomenon best 
exemplified in the lifestyles of jet-setting consumers of culture, while according 
to others it is manifest most clearly in the experiences of diasporic communities 
and migrant laborers. Faced with such a proliferation of often contradictory 
articulations, one might find it extremely difficult to form any kind of determinate 
conception of the meaning of cosmopolitanism. 
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 I believe, however, that we can begin to clarify the sense of the term by 
identifying a single, very broad commitment that all forms of cosmopolitan 
thought share, viz. that all human beings belong, or ought to be treated as if they 
belong, to one worldwide community. In what follows, I will provide an overview 
of the most important and influential articulations of cosmopolitanism, taking this 
shared commitment as a guiding thread. More specifically, I will treat 
cosmopolitan thought as falling into three categories: moral, political, and 
sociological. Moral and political cosmopolitanism are both concerned with 
normative questions, while sociological cosmopolitanism is primarily descriptive. 
Moral cosmopolitanism attempts to determine the nature and the sources of the 
obligations we have to others qua members of the worldwide community of 
human beings, while political cosmopolitanism, broadly speaking, attempts to 
determine what kind of transnational and international institutional framework is 
most appropriate for the governance of this community. And finally, sociological 
cosmopolitanism attempts to describe the connections that bind the worldwide 
community of human beings together. In addition, it is concerned to describe the 
relations between this community and the various national political communities. 
 
I. Moral Cosmopolitanism 
Moral cosmopolitanism can be described, at least provisionally and with 
some simplification, as the thesis according to which “every human being has 
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obligations to every other.”1 Our obligations to other human beings, in other 
words, are not based primarily, if at all, upon their being members of our own 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic communities. Rather, we have 
obligations to other human beings simply in virtue of their being human. Different 
cosmopolitan ethicists, of course, disagree on some of the details of the thesis. 
There is disagreement, for example, on how precisely to weigh the obligations we 
have to humanity in general against those we have to our particular communities. 
Some argue that no weighing is required at all, since “particular human 
relationships and group affiliations never provide independent reasons for action 
or suffice by themselves to generate special responsibilities to one’s intimates and 
associates.”2 On this view, preferential treatment can be justified only by 
reference to its benefit to humanity generally. Others argue for the more moderate 
cosmopolitan thesis that we have obligations to humanity in addition to those 
based on our more particular allegiances.3 Likewise, different theorists disagree 
about the source of our obligation to humanity in general. Some, including 
Marcus Aurelius, ground cosmopolitan obligation in the rationality that is 
common to all human beings.4 Others, like Epictetus, emphasize the arbitrariness 
of local affiliations: “Never in reply to the question, to what country do you 
belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of 
the world. For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say 
that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at 
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birth?”5 Finally, cosmopolitans disagree about how best to characterize the 
relation between the local and the universal. Many treat the relation as one 
between rich concreteness and bloodless abstraction, while others, such as 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, caution us against overstating the difference, 
emphasizing the great degree to which supposedly abstract “others” are in fact 
woven into the fabric of our everyday lives.6 But despite these various 
disagreements on the details, all moral cosmopolitans share a core commitment to 
the proposition that, ethically speaking, “everybody matters.”7 
 
 A. Ancient Moral Cosmopolitanism: Diogenes and Hierocles 
 The origins of moral cosmopolitanism can be traced back to the Cynic 
philosopher Diogenes, who is responsible for the doctrine’s name. Asked where 
he came from, Diogenes answered provocatively that he was a kosmopolitēs, a 
citizen of the world.8 In pronouncing himself a citizen of the world, Diogenes 
articulated what might be called the negative thesis of moral cosmopolitanism: he 
denied that his identity was bound up with the polis, which was regarded by the 
most important political thinkers of the time as providing the necessary normative 
context for the well-lived life.9 Diogenes denied the normative force of nomos or 
custom, including the norms of political life, emphasizing instead the importance 
of living in accordance with human nature, which is common to us all. He does 
not seem to have worked out any determinate conception of the positive 
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obligations we have toward other human beings in virtue of this common nature. 
Indeed, the only evidence we have of Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism comes from 
contemporary accounts of his way of life, which focus overwhelmingly on his 
very public practice of flouting social norms. Nonetheless, in denying the role of 
particular human relationships and affiliations as legitimate sources of obligation, 
Diogenes played an indispensable role in the development of a more contentful 
cosmopolitan morality. 
 Diogenes’ cardinal insight was developed into a positive moral philosophy 
by Stoic philosophers such as Zeno, Epictetus, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius. 
Owing to considerations of space, I will not be able to examine the contributions 
of each of these philosophers to the development of cosmopolitan thought. 
Instead, I will focus on one particular Stoic philosopher—Hierocles—who 
introduced an especially intuitive and influential model for thinking about 
cosmopolitan obligation. In a fragment preserved by Stobaeus, Hierocles writes 
that 
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, 
some smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the 
basis of their different and unequal dispositions relative to each 
other. The first and closest circle is the one which a person has 
drawn as though around a centre, his own mind…. Next, the 
second one further removed from the centre but enclosing the first 
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circle; this contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. The third 
one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and 
cousins…. The outermost and largest circle, which encompasses 
all the rest, is that of the whole human race. Once these have all 
been surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper 
treatment of each group, to draw the circles together somehow 
towards the centre, and to keep zealously transferring those from 
the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones…. It is incumbent on 
us to respect people from the third circle as if they were those from 
the second, and again to respect our other relatives as if they were 
those from the third circle….10 
Unlike Diogenes, Hierocles does not conceive the local and the universal as 
standing in a relation of opposition. One can regard oneself as a citizen of the 
world without renouncing one’s connections to the family or polis. The local and 
the universal are conceived rather with reference to a continuum of affection: the 
interior circles contain people, including ourselves, with whom we maintain 
strong, natural bonds of affection, while those in the outer circles are 
progressively more distant, both spatially and affectively. This way of conceiving 
the relation between local and universal shapes Hierocles’ moral cosmopolitanism 
in an important way. It suggests that our obligations to humanity in general do not 
require us to renounce our more particular affiliations. Indeed, Hierocles’ 
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articulation of cosmopolitan obligation presupposes that we experience these 
affiliations as making morally powerful claims on us. To fulfill our obligations 
toward those in the outer circles, we must treat them as if they belonged to the 
inner circles. It is our local, more particular affiliations and relationships, in other 
words, that provide the model for our obligations to humanity in general. The 
humanity toward which we are obligated, then, is not the kind of lifeless 
abstraction that holds minimal power over the moral imagination. Hierocles’ 
cosmopolitanism requires not that we adopt a psychologically unsustainable 
attitude of strict impartiality toward all human beings, but merely that we make it 
our project to extend our existing relations of affection outward toward 
progressively more distant circles. 
 
 B. Contemporary Moral Cosmopolitanism: Nussbaum and Appiah 
 Stoic cosmopolitanism of the kind exemplified by Hierocles remains 
enormously influential, informing the thought of philosophers reflecting on the 
moral difficulties of the contemporary world. Among the most prominent of these 
philosophers is Martha Nussbaum, whose essay “Patriotism and 
Cosmopolitanism” addresses the role of patriotic identification in education and in 
national self-consciousness generally. In the essay, Nussbaum responds to the 
philosopher Richard Rorty, who calls upon the American left to “rejoice in the 
country it inhabits” and to reaffirm “the idea of national identity, and the emotion 
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of national pride.”11 Nussbaum objects to Rorty’s appeal on cosmopolitan 
grounds. One of her most compelling arguments recalls Epictetus’ reflection on 
the arbitrariness of political identity. Contemporary multicultural liberal 
democracies must be able to persuade their citizens, who are divided, sometimes 
deeply, by differences in ethnicity, race, class, and gender, to respect each other 
and to work together for the common good. But why, Nussbaum asks, ought we 
to be concerned to work together across these differences within the boundaries of 
the state, but not outside those boundaries? “Why should we think of people from 
China as our fellows the minute they dwell in a certain place, namely the United 
States, but not when they dwell in a certain other place, namely China? What is it 
about the national boundary that magically converts people toward whom we are 
both incurious and indifferent into people to whom we have duties of mutual 
respect?”12 In addition, Nussbaum notes that the values on which citizens of 
liberal democratic states pride themselves, including the ideas that all human 
beings are created equal and are endowed with certain inalienable rights, 
including the right to pursue their own visions of the good life as they see fit, are 
remarkably cosmopolitan.13 To be true to the values of our own particular 
political community, on this account, just is to adopt a cosmopolitan point of 
view. Finally, Nussbaum makes an argument that has come to play an important 
role in more explicitly political and sociological forms of cosmopolitanism: many 
of the contemporary world’s most pressing problems simply cannot be addressed 
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within the context of isolated moral or political communities. Any adequate 
response to problems such as climate change, environmental pollution, and 
nuclear proliferation will require decision makers who are able to adopt a 
genuinely global outlook, transcending their particular attachments and points of 
view. 
 These kinds of cosmopolitan arguments have drawn much criticism from 
philosophers representing a broadly communitarian point of view. Two anti-
cosmopolitan arguments, which are closely related, have been especially 
prominent. The first is that cosmopolitanism disregards the necessary conditions 
for the development and sustenance of moral consciousness. According to 
Alasdair MacIntyre, “it is an essential characteristic of the morality which each of 
us acquires that it is learned from, in and through the way of life of some 
particular community.”14 The goods that one learns to pursue, the motivations one 
has for pursuing them, and the modes of life that are associated with those goods, 
are community-specific. Deprived of this thick normative context, one would no 
longer have any reason to be moral at all.15 The system of morality to which the 
cosmopolitan expects us to adhere, then, is hopelessly abstract. And this leads to 
the second of the two major anti-cosmopolitan arguments: we cannot reasonably 
be expected to extend our serious moral concern to humanity in general. Our 
moral concern is much more naturally directed toward those with whom we stand 
in concrete relations of love, friendship, collegiality, and trust. These, of course, 
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are primarily members of our own communities. Benjamin Barber summarizes 
this line of argumentation well: “Diogenes may have regarded himself as a citizen 
of the world, but global citizenship demands of its patriots levels of abstraction 
and disembodiment most women and men will be unable or unwilling to muster, 
at least in the first instance.”16 
 I would like to conclude this discussion of moral cosmopolitanism with a 
brief examination of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a 
World of Strangers, which can be read as a defense of cosmopolitanism against 
these sorts of objections. One of the principal theses that Appiah defends 
throughout the book is that moral cosmopolitanism does not require any kind of 
rootless, contentless existence or psychologically improbable levels of affection 
for abstract humanity. The conception of community life on which the 
communitarian objections rely is itself an abstraction. There is no community that 
is not, at least to some degree, a product of the kinds of migrations and 
contaminations that cosmopolitanism celebrates. Appiah describes his own 
childhood in Kumasi, Ghana, where he interacted regularly and as a matter of 
course with Indians, Syrians, Lebanese, Greeks, Hungarians, and various northern 
Europeans.17 He explains that the textiles we associate with the cultures of West 
Africa were originally milled and sold by the Dutch.18 Even the bagpipes came to 
Scotland from Egypt via the Roman infantry.19 The pervasiveness of cultural 
hybridization throughout history strongly suggests that “we do not need, have 
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never needed, settled community, a homogeneous system of values, in order to 
have a home. Cultural purity is an oxymoron.”20 If it is true, as Appiah suggests, 
that communities are and always have been cosmopolitan, then we have less 
reason to accept the communitarians’ worry that moral cosmopolitanism 
undermines the very conditions of moral life. 
 A second, and closely related, argument that runs throughout the text 
challenges the assumption that communication across cultural differences presents 
insurmountable difficulties. Cross-cultural communication is only that difficult, 
according to Appiah, “when we are trying to imagine making sense of a stranger 
in the abstract.”21 This is because we tend to think of cultural differences in terms 
of disagreements over basic values and principles. Within a culture, it is 
supposed, there is basic agreement on these values and principles; indeed, it is 
that agreement that holds the culture together. Members of other cultures, 
however, do not share those values and principles, and this makes communication 
and cooperation with these people extraordinarily difficult. This common-sense 
understanding of cross-cultural communication is mistaken. It is simply not true 
that members of a particular culture share a commitment to a set of core 
principles. The United States Constitution, for example, guarantees the freedom 
of religion. But there is certainly no agreement among citizens of the United 
States concerning the ultimate justification of that freedom. Some would point to 
the epistemic difficulties involved in determining the one true religion, while 
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others would cite the importance of protecting religion from government 
interference.22 Appiah’s point is that we do not need any agreement on principles; 
all that matters is that enough people accept the First Amendment protection of 
religious freedom for their own reasons, whatever they are. What is true of 
communication and cooperation within cultures is equally true between cultures. 
There is a great deal of similarity across cultures. Incest, for example, is regarded 
as morally bad among the Asante and among contemporary Americans. The 
Asante and the American would probably provide very different reasons for 
judging incest to be morally bad, but for practical purposes that does not matter.23 
When the theoretical Asante meets the theoretical American then, communication 
is precluded by disagreement over basic principles, but when the real Asante 
communicates with the real American, they understand each other well enough. 
Moral cosmopolitanism works, according to Appiah, precisely because it does not 
require us to relate to human beings in the abstract, but rather to concrete human 
beings whose perspectives we are perfectly capable of understanding, as long as 
we are willing to make the effort. 
 
II. Political Cosmopolitanism 
 
 A. Cosmopolitanism as Project for Peace: Kant and Kelsen 
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The essential point of reference for all of the most important contemporary 
articulations of political cosmopolitanism is Immanuel Kant’s conception of 
cosmopolitan right, which is developed in many different texts, but most 
thoroughly in “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project” and in Part One 
of The Metaphysics of Morals. In both of these works, Kant calls for the 
establishment of a league of nations, which he views as indispensible for securing 
the universal rights of human beings and for promoting a genuine peace that 
would be more than a mere temporary and precarious cessation of hostilities.  
 As a first step toward understanding Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan 
right, it is essential to appreciate the way in which that conception is grounded in 
concerns that are unambiguously moral. According to Kant, the establishment of a 
league of nations is “a direct duty.”24 The source of this duty, and indeed of all 
duties, is pure, i.e., non-empirical, reason. As Kant had argued in his Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, we can never hope to arrive at a determinate 
conception of our duties by means of any kind of empirical study of experience. A 
duty, for Kant, is an act that is morally necessary; it is one that we find ourselves 
commanded to perform, unconditionally. Because morality has its source in pure 
reason, its commands are the same for all rational beings, irrespective of their 
different life experiences and their different calculations of their own self-interest. 
 That part of practical philosophy that is specifically concerned with 
persons’ actions insofar as they affect the freedom of others is called the doctrine 
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of right. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant articulates the universal principle of 
right as follows: “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each 
can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.”25 This 
means that as long as a person exercises her freedom in a way that does not 
constrain the freedom of choice of another, then her act is right. The right to 
freely pursue one’s own projects, subject only to the limitation that one’s pursuit 
does not interfere with the free choice of others to pursue their own ends, is 
innate: it “belongs to everyone by nature, independently of any act that would 
establish a right.”26 Nonetheless in the state of nature, i.e., prior to the 
establishment of a civil condition, rights are insecure: in the absence of any 
established, commonly recognized system of law to institutionalize relations of 
right, persons may resort to “dealing with one another only in terms of the degree 
of force each has.”27 It is thus a duty to make right secure by agreeing to regulate 
social life in the state under coercive public laws. This duty, like all duties, is 
universal: it is binding on all rational persons, irrespective of whatever advantages 
they may have enjoyed or disadvantages they may have suffered from the 
relations of injustice that obtain in the state of nature. 
 The establishment of a civil condition within the state is not sufficient, 
however, to abolish the nonrightful condition that characterizes the state of nature. 
This is because the states themselves, in the absence of any higher 
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institutionalized system of right, relate to each other “only in terms of the degree 
of force each has.” In the international state of nature, “each state puts its 
majesty...in its not being subject to any external lawful coercion at all, and the 
splendor of its chief consists in his being able, without even having to put himself 
in danger, to command many thousands to sacrifice themselves for a matter that is 
of no concern to them.”28 This condition is detrimental to the rights of citizens of 
all states. Even when states are at peace, they must constantly prepare for the 
outbreak of war. In doing so, they can hardly avoid using their own citizens as 
means, conscripting them into standing armies and subjecting them to the burden 
of defense-related debt. Because of this, all rational beings have a duty to leave 
the international state of nature and to enter into a global condition of right. 
 In conceptualizing the kind of global civil condition that would put an end 
to the international state of nature, however, cosmopolitan theory must find a way 
to resolve a certain tension within the concept of right. On the one hand, as we 
have seen, rights are conceived as universal: one has them simply in virtue of 
being a human being, and not in virtue of being a particular kind of human being, 
e.g., a man, a Christian, a Frenchman, etc. On the other hand, these rights are 
secured, and one might even say realized, within particular states. Indeed, 
according to Kant it is the protection of these innate, universal rights that 
constitutes the state’s raison d’être. This tension gives rise to a question that every 
proponent of political cosmopolitanism must address: in the transition to a global 
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civil condition, to what extent should states retain their traditional roles as 
guarantors of universal rights, and to what extent should that function be taken 
over by supranational institutions? To what extent, in other words, should citizens 
be conceived as national citizens and to what extent as citizens of the world? 
 In the system that Kant proposed, states would retain almost all of their 
traditional functions. In order to effect a condition of international right, states 
would join together in a league, which would function primarily as an arbiter of 
their disputes, and thereby as a keeper of peace.29 In joining the league, however, 
the states would not surrender any of their sovereignty: the league of nations 
would not constitute a new global state, standing in a relation to its member states 
analogous to that between the United States and its fifty member states.30 
Specifically, the league would lack the authority to use coercion to enforce public 
law against the member states. Moreover, membership in the league would be 
entirely voluntary, so that the states could dissolve the union at any time. Kant 
recognizes that such a loose confederation of states would be insufficient to bring 
a definitive end to the nonrightful condition that obtains between states. He 
nonetheless endorses the idea of the league of nations for two reasons. First, he 
believes that states would be unwilling to renounce their sovereignty to the degree 
necessary to establish a genuine world state, “thus rejecting in hypothesi what is 
correct in thesi.”31 Second, and more importantly, he believes that a world state 
would do a worse job of protecting universal human rights than the various states: 
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“if such a state made up of nations were to extend too far over vast regions, 
governing it and so too protecting all its members would finally have to become 
impossible, while several such corporations would again bring on a state of 
war.”32 The league of nations, then, while not the ideal means of effecting a 
global civil condition, is according to Kant nonetheless the best practicable 
option. 
 In the twentieth century, the Austrian philosopher of law Hans Kelsen 
emerged as one of the most prominent and influential advocates of the Kantian 
cosmopolitical project. Kelsen’s cosmopolitanism, like Kant’s, is motivated 
primarily by the moral imperative to “eliminate the most terrible employment of 
force—namely, war—from inter-State relations.”33 And like Kant, Kelsen 
believes that genuine peace cannot be achieved unless states enter into a kind of 
global civil condition, leaving behind the relations of pure force that characterize 
the international state of nature. And finally, Kelsen agrees with Kant that this 
global condition cannot take the form of a world state, at least in the foreseeable 
future: even though such a state would be “an ideal solution of the problem of 
world organization as the problem of world peace,” it is unfortunately “confronted 
with serious and, at least at present, insurmountable difficulties.”34 
 The novelty of Kelsen’s cosmopolitan project consists in the emphasis it 
places on the role of an international judiciary. Writing at the time of the Second 
World War, Kelsen was interested in determining precisely why the League of 
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Nations had “failed completely” in its mission of securing international peace. He 
concluded that the League’s “fatal fault” was the centrality it gave to the Council 
of the League of Nations, which functioned as a kind of world government.35 The 
degree of centralization required by an effective world government required 
member states to sacrifice more of their sovereignty than they could have 
reasonably been expected to sacrifice. History shows that it takes a very long time 
to develop the degree of mutual trust necessary to sustain a centralized state with 
a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. If this is true for relatively small and 
relatively homogeneous nation-states, then it is certainly true for a world state. 
The solution to this problem, according to Kelsen, is to minimize the role of the 
legislature in international governance and to emphasize instead the role of the 
judiciary. What is essential to the project of world peace is that states renounce 
the prerogative to determine unilaterally whether or not they have been wronged 
by other states and to punish supposed wrongdoers as they see fit. States would be 
unwilling to surrender this prerogative to a world government, as this would 
undermine their sovereignty to an excessive degree. This is why “it is advisable to 
make a court, and not a government, the main instrument of an international 
reform. It is the line of least resistance…. Seldom has a State refused to execute 
the decision of a court to whose authority it has submitted itself in a treaty.”36 
 In order for this proposed judicial authority to play an effective role in 
securing international peace, it was necessary, Kelsen believed, that it should have 
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jurisdiction not just over states, taken as juristic persons, but also over individuals. 
According to the traditional interpretation, it is only states that are obligated by, 
and that can function as subjects of, international law. Of course acts of states are 
in reality acts performed by individuals in their capacity as agents of the state.37 
Nonetheless, the acts of those individuals have been traditionally imputed to the 
states themselves. Accordingly, punishments for violations of international law 
have not been carried out against the individuals responsible, but rather against 
the whole state, the vast majority of whose citizens may have been entirely 
innocent.38 This, of course, provides minimal disincentive for individual agents of 
the state to violate international law. The core commitment of Kelsen’s political 
cosmopolitanism, then, is the idea that laws must be enacted to establish 
“individual responsibility of the persons who as members of government have 
violated international law by resorting to or provoking war.”39 
 
 B. Cosmopolitanism and Democratic Legitimacy: Held and Habermas 
 In the early 1990s, when liberal democracy seemed to be emerging 
victorious throughout the world as the only viable and legitimate form of 
government, political theorists began to propose new articulations of the 
cosmopolitan project in an attempt to address the changed realities of the post-
Cold War world. These new cosmopolitanisms were no longer motivated 
primarily by a concern for world peace. They were animated rather by the desire 
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to defend the newly victorious liberal democratic values against threats posed to 
them by the increasing pace of globalization. More specifically, these 
cosmopolitanisms emphasized the traditional role of liberal democracy as a means 
of legitimating the power that states exercised against their own citizens. In the 
increasingly interconnected world of globalization, however, more and more of 
the real power that is exercised against persons escapes the control of individual 
states. The newer cosmopolitanisms, then, are concerned primarily with the 
question of how to preserve liberal democratic modes of legitimation in a world in 
which individual states no longer hold monopolies on the power exercised against 
their citizens. The two most influential forms of this kind of cosmopolitanism 
have been the project of cosmopolitan democracy, associated most closely with 
the work of David Held and Daniele Archibugi, and the project of constitutional 
patriotism, articulated by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. 
 According to David Held, the core value that is affirmed in the liberal 
democratic model of legitimation is that of autonomy, which is the principle 
according to which 
persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal 
obligations in the specification of the political framework which 
generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, 
they should be free and equal in the determination of the 
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conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy this 
framework to negate the rights of others.40 
The principle of autonomy is realized in liberal democracies by the mechanism of 
the vote: citizens periodically grant their consent to the government and its 
decisions by electing officials who represent their interests and preferences. This 
creates a symmetrical relationship between political decision-makers and those 
who are affected by their decisions: the power that political decision-makers 
exercise against and for the benefit of the citizens is power that the citizens 
themselves have legitimated through their consent.41 
 The liberal democratic model of legitimation has historically presupposed 
the existence of a determinate, territorially-bounded “we” that has constituted 
itself as a community by agreeing to live together in accordance with a specified 
institutional framework. The citizens who make up this “we” are regarded as the 
true stakeholders in the community. It is they who take on the burdens of 
maintaining the community, and it is they who reap the benefits. Cosmopolitan 
democracy constitutes an attempt to maintain the value of autonomy in the face of 
the breakdown of the historical presupposition of discrete, bounded political 
communities. In conditions of globalization, characterized by increased 
interconnectedness between political communities, and between groups or 
citizens belonging to different political communities, it becomes less and less the 
case that the set of stakeholders in a political community’s decisions corresponds 
  
22 
 
to the set of that community’s citizens. The symmetry that is essential to the 
liberal democratic model of legitimacy breaks down as the decisions of one 
community’s political officials come to affect more and more the lives of non-
members, who have no means of holding the decision-makers accountable. 
 The solution to these sorts of problems, according to proponents of 
cosmopolitan democracy, is to replace the system of state sovereignty with “a 
system of diverse and overlapping power centres, shaped and delimited by 
democratic law.”42 In such a system, states would cease to function as the ultimate 
legitimate authorities within their own borders. Sovereignty would rather be 
divided across four levels of governance: local, national, regional, and global. In 
order to determine which issues are to be dealt with at which levels, one would 
consult the principle of autonomy. One would attempt to delimit the set of people 
significantly affected by a particular issue and to determine which level of 
governance would contribute most effectively to the realization of those peoples’ 
objectives.43 Issues concerning the pollution of a river that runs through several 
states, for example, would call for regional governance, since the set of 
stakeholders does not correspond to the set of citizens of any one of the states. 
Issues that affect people throughout the world, such as climate change, human 
rights, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are best dealt 
with at the global level. In sum, then, the level at which an issue ought to be 
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addressed is the level at which the liberal democratic ideal of autonomy is most 
satisfactorily realized. 
 For Jürgen Habermas, the most problematic aspects of globalization are 
the de-nationalization of the economy and the consequent decline of political 
autonomy within democratic states. As capital becomes increasingly mobile, the 
specifically economic imperative of competitiveness comes to influence national 
decision-making more and more. Faced with worldwide competition, businesses 
continually strive to increase the productivity of their labor forces and to decrease 
their tax burdens. If states prove unwilling or unable to sustain environments 
friendly to the interests of business—if they remain committed to strong social 
welfare systems or to strong protections for labor unions, for example—then 
businesses can threaten to leave, depriving states of needed tax revenues. Faced 
with this permanent threat, citizens lose much of their capacity to freely determine 
the conditions of their own lives. Social life comes to be determined by the logic 
of the marketplace rather than by the specifically political norms of democratic 
legitimacy.44 
 In order to preserve the value of autonomous, democratic legitimation 
against the encroachments of market-based rationality, then, people must form 
themselves into political communities that transcend the traditional sovereign 
state. This, however, is no easy matter. According to Habermas, the triumph of 
liberal democracy over its rivals owes much to the fact that democratic ideals took 
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root in nation-states.45 The citizens of a nation-state viewed themselves as one 
people, united by a common race, language, culture, and history.46 This 
experience of national unity contributed to the sense of solidarity necessary to 
sustain the kinds of very large democracies that followed in the wake of the 
American and French Revolutions, where citizens who had no personal 
acquaintance with each other would cooperate in bearing the burdens and sharing 
the benefits of common governance. This sense of responsibility for one another’s 
well-being would be impossible if people did not regard their fellow citizens as 
“their own” people.47 There is simply no solidarity of this sort between citizens of 
different states. As a result, states come to view their economic competitiveness 
relative to other states as their highest priority, becoming more concerned with the 
needs of multinational corporations than with their own citizens’ capacity to 
contribute meaningfully to the steering of political life. According to Habermas, 
this “broad renunciation of the power of politics to shape social relations, and the 
readiness to abandon normative points of view in favor of adaptations to 
supposedly unavoidable systematic imperatives, now dominate the political 
arenas of the Western world.”48 
 Constitutional patriotism attempts to address this problem by steering a 
middle course between neo-nationalism, which proposes a return to the traditional 
model of sovereignty and a re-nationalization of economic life, and neo-
liberalism, which celebrates the weakening of the sovereign state as a liberation 
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from burdensome economic regulation and from compulsory cultural 
conformity.49 Habermas agrees with the neo-nationalist position that solidarity is 
essential to sustaining the kind of political space that can effectively defend the 
ideals of democratic legitimation against the domination of strictly economic 
forces. But he does not believe that this solidarity can be grounded in any 
experience of national unity. The era in which economic policy can be effectively 
steered at the level of the sovereign nation-state is decisively past. On this latter 
point, Habermas agrees with the neo-liberals. What is required, then, is the 
constitution of a transnational political community whose members would be 
united not by a thick cultural and historical commonality, but rather by a thin 
shared commitment to the basic principles of liberal democracy. Such a 
consensus, Habermas believes, can provide a sufficient basis for the kind of 
solidarity necessary to motivate citizens of different states to cooperate in the 
effective regulation of their common economic and political life. 
 
III. Sociological Cosmopolitanism 
 
 A. Critique of Methodological Nationalism: Beck 
 I would like to conclude this overview of cosmopolitan thought with an 
examination of sociological cosmopolitanism. Sociological cosmopolitanism 
differs from the older and better known moral and political varieties in its 
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emphasis on descriptive, rather than prescriptive, accounts of cross-cultural and 
transnational phenomena. From the sociological point of view, cosmopolitanism 
is less an ethical ideal or political project than an actually existing social reality. 
According to cosmopolitan sociologists, many of the most basic conceptual and 
theoretical commitments of classical sociology obscure rather than clarify this 
reality. Specifically, all those whose work can be described under the rubric of 
sociological cosmopolitanism are committed to denying the descriptive adequacy 
of what Ulrich Beck calls the container model of society. Classical sociological 
theory has tended to view societies as discrete and relatively homogeneous, 
territorially contained within the borders of sovereign nation-states.50 Sociologists 
have been slow to recognize the inadequacy of this model, in large part because 
the discipline’s foundational theoretical perspectives were established during the 
time when the nation-state was emerging as the dominant form of political 
organization in the societies of the north Atlantic rim.51 Even at the time of the 
discipline’s emergence, however, the container model misrepresented the reality 
of the vast majority of the world’s peoples, whose political lives were dominated 
by the nationally organized colonizing powers of the north Atlantic. The more 
recently emerging processes of globalization, characterized by a global mass 
media, increased economic interdependence and the worldwide sharing of risks, 
have rendered the container model obsolete everywhere. The cosmopolitan 
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sociologists attempt, in various ways, to reformulate the basic theoretical 
commitments of sociology in order to better account for these changed realities. 
 Perhaps the most influential sociologist working in this tradition is Ulrich 
Beck, whose work persistently challenges the dominance within sociology of 
what he calls methodological nationalism. The basic commitment of 
methodological nationalism is the container model of society, which entails a kind 
of either/or logic that systematically misdescribes social reality. From 
methodological nationalism’s conceptualization of society on the model of the 
nation-state, it follows that social or cultural belonging is understood by analogy 
with citizenship: one either belongs to a particular culture or one does not. The 
operation of this either/or logic is nicely illustrated by Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, 
who describes the kind of “where-are-you-from-originally” dialogue that takes 
place when someone who is obviously a native within a particular culture 
converses with someone whose appearance or strange-sounding name deviates 
from the norm: 
‘Where do you come from?’—‘From Essen.’ 
‘No, I mean originally?’—I was born in Essen.’ 
‘But your parents?’—‘My mother comes from Essen.’ 
‘But your father?’—‘My father is Italian.’ 
‘A-ha…!’ 
‘Is that an Italian name?’—‘Yes.’ 
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‘So what part of Italy do you come from?’—‘I don’t come from Italy.’52 
From the point of view of the more obviously German native in this example, it is 
simply inconceivable that his interlocutor could really be one of “us” in any 
deeply meaningful sense. He seems to understand that people who do not look 
traditionally German and who do not have traditionally German names can be 
citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. What he cannot conceive is that 
such people could really be German. And if they are not German, they must be 
something else, lifelong residence and linguistic competence notwithstanding. 
This explains his insistence on assigning his interlocutor the identity “Italian,” 
despite the fact that he resists that identification. Most fundamentally, one is 
either an authentic German or one is not; there is no third possibility. 
 Sociologists committed to methodological nationalism argue that this 
territorial conception of identity is necessary both for individuals’ self-
understanding and for social integration. But this, according to Beck, is 
empirically false: “All methods of enquiry that operate with statistical concepts 
such as ‘foreigner’ and ‘native’ are unprepared for the realities of life in a world 
that is becoming increasingly transnational and involves plural attachments that 
transcend the boundaries of countries and nationality.”53 An example of this 
phenomenon is what Beck calls cosmopolitan empathy. With recent developments 
in communication technology, including 24-hour cable news and the Internet, we 
have gained an unprecedented degree of access to worlds that would formerly 
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have been closed off to us. As a result, we develop more and more the capacity to 
identify with people who are not members of our own national communities. The 
situations of Muslims in France or of the poor in the favelas of Brazil, for 
example, become the concern not just of French or Brazilian citizens, but of the 
whole world. As Kant had argued already in “Toward Perpetual Peace,” “the 
peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal 
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one 
part of the world is felt everywhere.”54 People come to identify with French 
Muslims and with the poor of Brazil, even if they are neither French, Muslim, 
poor, nor Brazilian. And this kind of identification is more than merely affective: 
as the worldwide demonstrations protesting the impending invasion of Iraq 
showed, people from around the world are becoming committed to concrete social 
and political action on the basis of such transnational identifications.55 
 A second source of cosmopolitan identity-formation that Beck emphasizes 
is the recognition of risks whose scope is global and that cannot be effectively 
managed by individual nation-states. As the recent accident at the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant has demonstrated once again, the regulation of 
nuclear power is a matter of global concern. Although the plant is located in Japan 
and is managed by a Japanese corporation, the consequences of its meltdown are 
felt by the entire world. The “we” that is affected by the crisis and that mobilizes 
both to minimize its damage and to prevent similar disasters in the future, is not 
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primarily a Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Russian, or American “we,” but rather a 
global one. The same is true of the “we” that emerges from the recognition of 
economic and climatological risk, which have long since ceased to be primarily 
national risks. 
 What these examples of cosmopolitan empathy and global risk suggest is 
that social identification is much better understood on the model of both/and 
rather than the model of either/or. It is no longer true—and probably never was—
that identity is straightforwardly national, such that one would always be able to 
give an unambiguous and consistent answer to the question, Who am I? One can 
identify, as Kwame Anthony Appiah reminds us, with one’s hometown (Kumasi), 
one’s region (Asante), a couple of different nation-states (Ghana and the United 
Kingdom), their continents, and with the world as a whole.56 Under conditions of 
real cosmopolitanism, then, “one constructs a model of one’s identity by dipping 
freely into the Lego set of globally available identities and building a 
progressively inclusive self-image. The result is the proud affirmation of a 
patchwork, quasi-cosmopolitan, but simultaneously provincial, identity….”57 
 
 B. A Sociology of Networks: Urry and Castells 
 John Urry goes even further in his rejection of the presuppositions of 
methodological nationalism, denying the explanatory value of the concept of 
society altogether. Urry cites with conditional approval former British Prime 
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Minister Margaret Thatcher’s provocative claim that “there is no such thing as 
society.” Urry believes that this claim was “oddly right” in the sense that the 
proposition itself was true, even though it was wrong in terms of the sense that 
she intended. What Thatcher meant, of course, was that there is no such thing as 
“society” over and above the individuals who compose it. Urry agrees that there is 
no such thing as society, but insists that there certainly are processes, which he 
describes as post-societal, that do “lie beyond individual men and women,” and 
that shape the qualities of their interpersonal relationships and life experiences 
enormously.58 He conceives of these post-societal processes as mobilities, or 
flows of people and objects through networks that are not delimited by or 
explainable in terms of nation-states or national societies. These mobilities, he 
argues, must become the focus of the discipline of sociology if it is to remain 
relevant in the twenty-first century. 
 Urry’s sociology of mobilities builds on Manuel Castells’s influential 
theorization of the network society. A network, in Castells’s sense of the term, is 
simply “a set of interconnected nodes.”59 Networks define the topology of social 
space in profound ways: within the network, “the distance (or intensity and 
frequency of interaction) between two points (or social positions) is shorter (or 
more frequent, or more intense) if both points are nodes in a network than if they 
do not belong to the same network.”60 This means that the life experiences and 
opportunities of individuals are shaped less by their absolute locations within a 
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bounded territorial social space than by their positions relative to the nodes of the 
network. An airport is an example of a node in a network that channels the flow 
of persons. A person who lives near one of these nodes may be closer, socially 
speaking, to her peers on another continent than to her fellow citizens who live 
200 miles away. Another example is a television, which functions as a node 
within a network through which informative or entertaining images and sounds 
flow. Someone who has access to such a node becomes socially close to much of 
the rest of the world, while someone without access remains more firmly fixed to 
the social world of her absolute geographical location. According to Urry’s post-
societal sociology, it is these sorts of networks, and not “society,” that have 
explanatory value in accounting for the social experiences and opportunities of 
individuals. 
 The proliferation of these networks beyond the borders of nation-states 
contributes to establishing the conditions of possibility for cosmopolitanism as a 
lived social reality. Bronislaw Szerszynski and John Urry refer in this context to a 
“banal globalism,” i.e., an everyday, taken-for-granted sense of oneself as 
connected affectively, economically, aesthetically, and morally to individuals and 
cultures outside one’s own locality or nation.61 This banal globalism is not the 
same thing as lived cosmopolitanism, which entails an active curiosity about and 
concern for other peoples and cultures, along with an ability to appreciate and 
understand them. But it does, at least to an extent, support its development. 
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Szerszynski and Urry’s research has demonstrated the ways in which imaginative 
travel through television creates “an awareness of cosmopolitan 
interdependence.”62 Interviews with focus groups in the United Kingdom revealed 
“a widespread if rather general cosmopolitanism. People had a strong awareness 
of the global flows of money, commodities and pollution; of extended relations 
connecting them to other peoples, places and environments; of the blurring 
boundaries of nation, culture and religion; and of a diverse range of possible local, 
national and global experiences.”63 In addition, participants demonstrated a kind 
of cosmopolitan moral sensibility, taking as their exemplars such iconic figures as 
Princess Diana, Nelson Mandela, and Bob Geldof, whom they had become 
acquainted with through the mass media.64 
 It is important, though, not to overstate the degree to which mass media 
networks can create a sense of global belonging and solidarity. Szerszynski and 
Urry report that participants’ levels of moral concern tended to decrease with 
distance, and that they viewed their exemplars of cosmopolitan morality as 
idealists, going above and beyond the demands of everyday morality.65 Moreover, 
as John Tomlinson has argued, there is a kind of affective distancing involved in 
television viewing, which limits the medium’s “capacity to involve and engage us 
emotionally and morally…. Because of these limitations it is implausible that 
media experience alone will furnish us with a sense of global solidarity.”66 
Despite these concerns, though, Szerszynski and Urry conclude from their 
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research that “television and travel, the mobile and the modem” are slowly 
producing a cosmopolitan civil society and a cosmopolitan ethical sensibility, 
characterized by a blurring of the distinction between the local and the global.67 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 I would like to conclude by tying together some of the threads of 
cosmopolitan discourse that I have separated for purposes of exposition, as it 
would be highly misleading to suggest that these different programs of research 
are carried on without reference or relevance to the others. Specifically, I would 
like to highlight three important connections. First, there is a strong and obvious 
connection between the two normative strands of cosmopolitanism. Political 
cosmopolitanism, as Kant argued explicitly, is concerned with establishing the 
global political institutions necessary to fulfill our moral obligations to other 
human beings generally, without reference to their status as citizens or subjects of 
particular states. As such, political cosmopolitanism presupposes a conception of 
moral cosmopolitanism. One’s conception of the appropriate global political 
institutions will certainly be shaped by one’s conception of cosmopolitan 
obligation. For example, a theorist who was committed to a strict version of moral 
cosmopolitanism, i.e., one who believed that particular human relationships and 
affiliations provide no independent, morally valid reasons for action, would likely 
favor an international order that weakened the sovereignty of states, lessening 
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their power to make decisions oriented entirely or primarily by the perceived best 
interests of their own citizens. On the other hand, a political cosmopolitan who 
accepted the validity, at least to some extent, of particularist and communitarian 
critiques of strict moral cosmopolitanism, would likely favor an international 
order that preserved more of the elements of traditional, Westphalian state 
sovereignty. 
 Second, political cosmopolitanism can benefit from the results of 
sociological cosmopolitan research. Political cosmopolitan projects that are 
motivated by the desire to preserve democratic models of legitimacy in conditions 
of global interdependence require the existence of something like a global public 
sphere. Whether or to what extent such a thing exists, or can be brought into 
existence, is a question for empirical sociological research. In addition, Held’s 
global democratic project relies on empirical knowledge of the ways in which 
people’s lives are interconnected across political boundaries in order to determine 
who the relevant stakeholders are in the various areas of local, national, regional, 
and global governance. 
 And finally, moral cosmopolitanism can also make valuable use of 
sociological cosmopolitan research. For example, research concerning the degree 
to which society is and has been actually cosmopolitan can shed a great deal of 
light on the debate between moral cosmopolitans and their communitarian critics. 
If, as Beck suggests, societies are not nearly as homogeneous and as territorially 
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delimited as classical sociology had thought, or if, as Urry suggests, society does 
not even exist, then the communitarian’s concern about the necessary conditions 
for moral development will carry less weight. Of course there are sociologists 
who believe that cosmopolitans’ claims about the decline of the nation-state and 
of national society are vastly overstated. If these sociologists are correct, then 
those who are committed to some version of moral cosmopolitanism might be 
more inclined to adopt the kind of moderate cosmopolitan ethics exemplified by 
Nussbaum and Appiah. 
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